

TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION IN THAILAND

NO SAFE HAVEN FOR ACTIVISTS AND DISSIDENTS IN EXILE

Brief Assessment of the Implementation of the 3rd Cycle UPR Recommendations

Thailand is frequently portrayed as a safe haven for human rights defenders (HRDs) fleeing persecution across Southeast Asia. It functions as a space of legal limbo and heightened vulnerability, where individuals remain exposed to transnational repression (TNR), defined by OHCHR as acts conducted or directed by a State, or its proxies, to deter, silence or punish dissent, criticism or human rights advocacy expressed from outside its territory. Since Thailand's 3rd UPR cycle, TNR has intensified sharply in scale, sophistication and visibility. Freedom House's 2026 global data identify Thailand as the top host country in the world with the highest number of recorded incidents of physical TNR, while Southeast Asia has become a major centre of authoritarian cross-border collaboration. **Thailand is therefore no longer only a country through which people seek refuge: it has become a regional operational hub for transnational repression**, where foreign governments pursue dissidents, refugees, journalists and HRDs through detention, forced return, surveillance, digital targeting, intimidation, disappearance and violence.

During Thailand's 3rd UPR cycle in November 2021, Thailand received no recommendations specifically addressing transnational repression or the protection of individuals targeted by TNR. It nevertheless received recommendations addressing related protection gaps. Thailand supported recommendations to halt the return of refugees to situations of risk (52.78), strengthen legal protection for refugees and asylum seekers (52.79), provide healthcare to migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in detention (52.70), and consider ratifying the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol (51.16). It noted recommendations calling for ratification of the Refugee Convention (52.14 and 52.15) and expansion of social welfare, including the right to work, for refugees and asylum seekers (52.80). **Limited progress since the 3rd cycle includes Thailand's ratification of the ICPPED in 2024 and the entry into force of the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2022) in 2023, including its Section 13 prohibition of refoulement.**

This represents a major change since Thailand's 3rd UPR cycle in 2021, when TNR had not reached its current intensity and Thailand received no TNR-specific recommendations. Since then, the risk landscape has fundamentally changed: Thailand has become the world's top recorded host country for transnational repression. UPR IV must therefore explicitly address TNR through concrete and measurable recommendations.

0 UPR III Recommendations
related to transnational repression

TOP HOST GLOBALLY FOR RECORDED INCIDENTS OF TNR

The TNR protection crisis is compounded by a governance gap. Thailand has no dedicated legal or policy framework on TNR, no single authority responsible for prevention and response, no functional cross-agency early-warning or referral mechanism, and no systematic process for coordinating immigration authorities, police, the Ministry of Justice, the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, UN agencies, embassies and frontline protection actors. Existing systems operate in silos and were not designed for fast-moving cases in which a foreign State can combine digital surveillance, passport cancellation, immigration enforcement, extradition requests, family intimidation and informal security cooperation. This produces three interlocking failures: (1) prevention failures, including the absence of early warning and cross-border risk monitoring; (2) protection failures, including insecure legal status, detention risks, inadequate safe pathways and weak emergency response; and (3) accountability failures, including fragmented investigations and impunity for TNR committed or facilitated on Thai territory.

International Human Rights Law & Standards

Although no single treaty is dedicated to TNR, the conduct it encompasses engages established obligations under the ICCPR, CAT, ICPPED, international refugee law and the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, including duties to respect and ensure the rights to life, liberty and security, freedom from torture and enforced disappearance, privacy, expression, assembly and association; to uphold non-refoulement; to protect persons within the State's jurisdiction from foreseeable harm by foreign State agents or proxies; and to investigate violations and provide effective remedies. On 23 September 2026, more than 130 UN Special Procedures mandate holders and treaty-body experts issued a landmark joint statement calling for coordinated, rights-based and victim-centred responses, stronger laws and policies, protection pathways, accountability, safeguards against misuse of INTERPOL and other cooperation mechanisms, and regulation of surveillance technologies. These developments provide a much clearer international framework for TNR-specific UPR recommendations to Thailand.

This UPR Factsheet was prepared by **Manushya Foundation, Power by the Keyboard, Mother Nature Cambodia, Khmer Democratic Rescue Foundation, Viet Tan, Khmer Democracy Organization, Asylum Access Thailand, and the Thai CSOs Coalition for the UPR and UN Mechanisms**

REALITIES ON THE GROUND

Challenges | **Case, Facts, and Comments**

Challenge 1: Legal invisibility of transnational repression, absence of asylum framework, and enabling immigration architecture

Thailand does not recognise transnational repression (TNR) in law or policy. Under international law, including the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture (CAT), and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED, ratified 2024), Thailand has binding obligations to prevent, investigate, and ensure accountability for violations on its territory, including those involving foreign actors. Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol.

Thailand lacks a comprehensive asylum and TNR protection system. It has not ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention or its 1967 Protocol, and UNHCR recognition does not confer reliable domestic legal status or protection against immigration arrest.

The National Screening Mechanism (NSM) does not explicitly treat transnational repression as a risk factor. Applicants can face arrest, detention or deportation while awaiting a decision; screening is not sufficiently independent or transparent, lacks assured confidential access to UNHCR and safeguards against interference by the State of origin, and does not provide a stable right to work or lawful residence for everyone in need of protection. These gaps are most acute when the government pursuing a person also controls their passport and seeks cooperation from Thai officials.

The Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979) actively facilitates TNR. Section 36 allows authorities to revoke legal status; Section 54 permits indefinite detention without effective judicial oversight; Section 64 criminalises assistance to individuals without legal status with penalties of up to five years' imprisonment and THB 100,000 fine, providing no exemptions for humanitarian or legal assistance. In practice, HRDs, refugees and asylum seekers are treated as irregular migrants, creating a pipeline from legal precarity to detention and deportation.

Thailand's extradition and mutual legal assistance frameworks lack adequate human rights safeguards. Decisions remain highly discretionary, with no binding obligation to assess risks of persecution, torture or unfair trial. In May 2025, Thailand and Viet Nam signed a comprehensive agreement to combat crime and facilitate the transfer of convicted persons, raising serious concerns for Vietnamese dissidents. On 28 May 2026, Thai PM Anutin Charnvirakul and Vietnamese President To Lam issued a joint statement pledging bilateral cooperation to suppress political activism against each other's governments. Informal "swap mart" practices allow States to exchange dissidents outside formal legal processes.

Thailand has a governance gap for TNR. No law or national policy defines TNR or assigns a lead authority responsible for prevention, protection, investigation and accountability. There is no institutionalised cross-agency early-warning, referral or case-coordination mechanism linking immigration authorities, police, justice institutions, the NHRCT, UN agencies, embassies and frontline protection actors. Mandates remain fragmented even though TNR cases routinely cross immigration, refugee protection, criminal justice, digital security, extradition and diplomatic domains.



SOURCE: COSUNAM, Vietnam Human Rights Report (2023)

National Screening Mechanism (NSM) inadequate. The NSM, introduced as a framework to identify and protect refugees in need of international protection, does not explicitly recognise TNR as a risk factor, provides no safeguards tailored to individuals targeted by foreign governments, lacks independence, transparency and effective coordination with UNHCR, and provides no guarantees of confidentiality or protection from interference by foreign authorities. Individuals often remain in legal precarity or detention while awaiting screening.



"Swap mart": informal cross-border cooperation among authoritarian. In 2024, HRW documented a pattern of transnational repression in which Thai authorities helped neighbouring governments take unlawful actions against dissidents and activists seeking protection in Thailand. In exchange, Thai authorities were able to target critics of the Thai government living in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia as part of a "swap mart" for refugees and dissidents.

REALITIES ON THE GROUND

Challenges | **Case, Facts, and Comments**

Faster deportation without effective safeguards increases the risk of torture and disappearance. The Prime Minister's Office Regulation on Deportation B.E. 2569 (2026), effective 28 August 2026, establishes a unified and expedited procedure for the deportation of foreign nationals from Thailand. It permits removal on broad "public order" and "good morals" grounds without requiring a criminal conviction. It contains no explicit and effective safeguards guaranteeing that refugees, asylum seekers, HRDs, journalists, political dissidents and others at risk will receive an individual assessment of the dangers they face if returned, access to a lawyer and UNHCR, a genuine opportunity to challenge deportation, or automatic suspension of removal while their appeal or protection claim is being considered. The Regulation covers unlawful entry or stay, the situation in which most political refugees find themselves. The Regulation risks violating Section 13 of the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2023), ICCPR Articles 2(3), 6, 7 and 13, CAT Article 3, and ICPPED Article 16.

UN experts warned Thailand against the fast-track deportation framework on 5 August 2026. On 5 August 2026, UN experts publicly noted with concern the Thai Cabinet's approval of draft regulations establishing a unified and expedited procedure for the deportation of foreign nationals on 14 July 2026, and stressed that "any new framework must fully incorporate international human rights safeguards, including access to asylum procedures, individualised risk assessments, effective judicial review with suspensive effect, and full respect for the principle of non-refoulement." They warned that without such safeguards, the new framework could increase the risk of refoulement of asylum seekers and refugees including HRDs facing persecution.

Short deadlines undermine access to protection and safe transfer.

- An administrative appeal to the Prime Minister must be lodged within **seven days.**
- Separately, a State or international organisation must request transfer to a safe third country through diplomatic channels within **seven days** of the deportation order.
- Transfer must be completed **within 30 days**, extendable **twice by up to 30 days** each, a maximum of **90 days.** These are transfer extensions, not additional appeals.

If transfer fails, the regulation directs authorities back to removal to the country of nationality or, where nationality cannot be determined, last residence. Expiry of these deadlines cannot override Section 13 of the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2022), which prohibits return to a risk of torture or enforced disappearance.



The new deportation framework has moved rapidly from adoption to enforcement. Within days of the Prime Minister's Office Regulation on Deportation B.E. 2569 entering into force on 28 August 2026, Thai authorities began applying its conduct-based deportation pathway. On 7 September, Prime Minister and Interior Minister Anutin Charnvirakul ordered the deportation of French national Kevin Dimino, co-owner of a zoo on Koh Samui, under Section 5 of the Deportation Act B.E. 2499 (1956) together with Clause 4 of the new Regulation. The order cited conduct considered contrary to public order, good morals, and public well-being. A Koh Samui court had separately convicted Dimino of traffic offences and imposed a THB 5,000 fine. The case demonstrates that the new administrative deportation mechanism is already operational and can be invoked under the broad conduct-based route even where the underlying criminal penalty is relatively minor.

Challenge 2: Systematic non-refoulement violations and forced returns of political refugees to countries of persecution

Non-refoulement: Section 13 of the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2023) incorporates the principle of non-refoulement into Thai domestic law. In practice, Thailand has repeatedly failed to uphold this principle. Courts have declined to assess human rights risks in extradition proceedings. Individualised risk assessments, due process and effective remedies prior to removal are consistently absent. Mass expulsions and secret deportations have been repeatedly documented from mid-2024 onwards.

Thailand does not conduct meaningful individualised assessments before removal, and in multiple documented cases has ignored public calls by UN experts to halt deportations. Deportations have been carried out in coordination with the authoritarian consolidation of Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam, exposing forcibly returned refugees to arbitrary detention, torture, unfair trials, enforced disappearance and death.

June 2024: mass expulsion of Myanmar asylum seekers.
The Committee against Torture (2024) highlighted the mass expulsion of asylum seekers from Myanmar. Over four million people have fled conflict and repression in Myanmar and been treated by Thai authorities as irregular migrants subject to harassment, extortion, arrest and deportation.

24-25 November 2024: six Cambodian opposition activists forcibly returned, plus family members including a 5-year-old.
hai immigration officials in Pathum Thani province arrested Pen Chan Sangkream, Hong An, Mean Chanthon, Yin Chanthou, Soeung Khunthea and Vorn Chanratchana on 24 November 2024 (four women and two men), including the 5-year-old grandson of one activist. They were forcibly returned the next day and detained by Cambodian authorities in three separate prisons under arrest warrants issued by the Phnom Penh Municipal Court. Cambodia later charged them with treason for social media posts criticising the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area agreement. Several were UNHCR-recognised refugees.

REALITIES ON THE GROUND

Challenges | **Case, Facts, and Comments**



A Uyghur man embraces family members after arriving in China following his forced deportation from Thailand. 40 Uyghurs were deported in secret despite grave risk upon return. **SOURCE:** ABC News (27 February 2025)

CAT (2024) on non-refoulement and immigration detention. The Committee against Torture (2024) acknowledged the formal recognition of non-refoulement in Thai law but expressed serious concern regarding its implementation, and expressed concern over Thailand's continued use of immigration detention and deportation practices, including cases involving individuals at risk of persecution.

The framing of dissidents as **'terrorists'** by their States of origin is used to legitimise extradition requests and forced returns, notably in the case of Y Quynh Bdap. The CEDAW Committee (2025) called for gender-sensitive protection frameworks for women asylum seekers and refugees, individualised risk assessments accounting for gender-based persecution, and safeguards to prevent mothers and children from being held in immigration detention.

Foreign States' "national security" designations and information-sharing can extend repression to family members in Thailand. Foreign governments can transmit politically motivated security information about dissidents to Thai authorities, resulting in immigration action not only against the targeted activist but also against their relatives. Without an independent human rights and TNR risk assessment, cross-border security information-sharing can make Thai immigration controls an extension of repression by the State of origin.

27 February 2025: 40 Uyghurs forcibly deported to China in secret. Thailand forcibly returned 40 Uyghurs to China despite well-documented risks of enforced disappearance, torture and arbitrary detention. The deportation took place in secret, without transparency or due process. Thai authorities ignored a public call by UN experts to halt the deportations. The 40 individuals had been held in de facto incommunicado detention for over a decade, with five Uyghurs reportedly dying in custody, two of them children.

28 November 2025: Y Quynh Bdap forcibly returned to Viet Nam under a 'terrorism' framing. Montagnard human rights and religious activist Y Quynh Bdap, a UNHCR-recognised refugee arrested in June 2024 following an extradition request from Viet Nam, was forcibly returned despite serious risks of persecution. A Vietnamese court had sentenced him in absentia to 10 years' imprisonment on terrorism-related charges, illustrating how the label of 'terrorism' is deployed by States of origin to instrumentalise extradition and forced return.

17 July 2026: Tan Yixiang quietly deported to China. Tan Yixiang, a Catholic human rights defender and UNHCR-recognised refugee advocating for Tibetan and Uyghur rights, was detained by Thai immigration authorities in February 2024 and quietly deported to China on 17 July 2026, days before Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul's 16-20 July 2026 official visit to China. Thai authorities gave no notice to UNHCR, his lawyer or Canadian authorities involved in his resettlement. The Government has still given no public account of when he was transferred, what process was followed, or where he is now.

YL: teenage daughter denied entry in Thailand after her activist father was targeted by China as a national security threat. On 28 February 2026, YL, the 14-year-old daughter of a Chinese activist targeted by Chinese authorities as a national security threat, was refused entry to Thailand despite attempting to enter legally. Information concerning her father had been transmitted to Thai authorities, and his political/security profile affected his daughter's ability to enter Thailand. Immigration officers handed her an expulsion notification without any explanation. The case illustrates how cross-border information-sharing concerning a dissident can extend TNR to family members who are not themselves accused of wrongdoing.

Challenge 3: Digital TNR as a pathway to physical TNR

Digital TNR is not confined to online harm. It can rapidly escalate into physical harm. Surveillance, doxxing, coordinated harassment, threats, manipulated content, and exposure of personal or location information can identify, track, intimidate, and isolate dissidents in exile, exposing their locations and networks and increasing their vulnerability to arrest, deportation, abduction, and physical attack.

In Thailand, these risks are compounded by extensive domestic surveillance capacities and cross-border cooperation with foreign governments. Yet existing protection mechanisms do not adequately identify or respond to such threats before they escalate, leaving refugees, asylum seekers, HRDs, journalists, and political dissidents exposed to both digital and physical forms of cross-border repression.

Thailand's digital-surveillance infrastructure enables pathways from digital to physical TNR. Thailand's domestic digital-surveillance infrastructure can transform digital repression into physical protection risks for dissidents in exile. CCTV tracking, interception technologies, IP-address tracing, and social-media monitoring can expose activists' locations, movements, and networks, enabling cross-border identification, bilateral pressure, and subsequent enforcement against individuals targeted by foreign governments. Digital TNR must therefore be treated not merely as an online rights violation, but as an early protection risk that can precede and facilitate physical TNR.

Sustained digital TNR preceded the disappearance in Thailand. Khieo Lapchanh, a 26-year-old Lao political activist living in Thailand, was subjected to sustained digital transnational repression before his disappearance on 15 September 2026. He faced coordinated online harassment, attempts to expose his whereabouts, death threats, and AI-generated content depicting violence against him. In March 2026, an online commenter reportedly offered USD 8,000 to have Khieo killed and USD 2,000 to have a person who defended him killed. Fearing for his safety, Khieo stopped his online activism.

REALITIES ON THE GROUND

Challenges | **Case, Facts, and Comments**

Digital transnational repression has been documented as an early warning sign of physical TNR: online surveillance, coordinated harassment, doxxing, death threats and AI-generated content used to identify, locate, isolate and silence activists in Thailand can escalate into offline protection risks, as the September 2026 disappearance of Khieo Lapchanh illustrates. (For the digital dimension of TNR, including cross-border cyber-harassment and AI-generated deepfake threats, see companion factsheet on Digital Rights.)

Khieo has been missing since the early hours of 15 September 2026. His last known physical location was the restaurant where he worked in Samut Sakhon. He was scheduled to attend his first UNHCR registration interview the following day and had prepared evidence documenting the digital TNR and threats he had experienced. Whether his disappearance is connected to those threats has not been established. However, the documented attempts to expose his whereabouts and threats against his life demonstrate why digital TNR must be treated as a potential warning of physical danger and why the possibility that it escalated into physical TNR requires urgent investigation.

Challenge 4: Enforced disappearances, killings and violent attacks against foreign dissidents on Thai territory

Thailand has witnessed multiple cases of enforced disappearances and suspicious deaths of foreign dissidents, demonstrating the inability, or unwillingness, of authorities to guarantee protection even to those formally recognised as refugees. TNR on Thai soil has also taken the form of targeted killings, raising serious concerns about the State's capacity or willingness to prevent such acts.

These cases have gone largely uninvestigated. The Committee against Torture (2024) raised concerns regarding the persistent failure to investigate enforced disappearances, including cases involving foreign dissidents in Thailand. HRW's World Report 2026 notes that none of the outstanding enforced disappearance cases have been resolved. Cross-border coordination with countries of origin has been alleged in multiple cases.



Lao pro-democracy activist Od Sayavong, a UNHCR-recognised refugee
He disappeared in Bangkok in August 2019. His fate remains unknown.

SOURCE: Prachatai, September 2019

August 2019: Od Sayavong, Lao pro-democracy activist and UNHCR-recognised refugee, disappeared in Bangkok. Od Sayavong, a Lao pro-democracy activist and UNHCR-recognised refugee, disappeared in Bangkok in August 2019. No credible investigation has clarified his fate or whereabouts.

2019: Truong Duy Nhat, Vietnamese journalist, abducted in Bangkok; sentenced to 10 years. Vietnamese journalist Truong Duy Nhat was abducted in Bangkok in 2019 after being apprehended by Thai authorities. He subsequently resurfaced in Viet Nam, where he was prosecuted and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Accounts of his disappearance suggest that he was initially detained by Thai police who handed him over to agents of the Vietnamese state.

April 2023: Duong Van Thai, Vietnamese journalist and UNHCR-recognised refugee, abducted near Bangkok. An independent journalist and UNHCR-recognised refugee, Duong Van Thai was abducted near Bangkok in April 2023. Evidence compiled through CCTV footage, testimonies and digital traces suggests the involvement of Vietnamese agents operating across borders. He later reappeared in Viet Nam, where he was detained, tried in a closed proceeding, and sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

May 2023: Bounsuan Kitiyano, Lao activist and UNHCR-recognised refugee, found dead in Ubon Ratchathani. Bounsuan Kitiyano, a Lao activist affiliated with pro-democracy movements and a UNHCR-recognised refugee awaiting resettlement, was found dead in Ubon Ratchathani in May 2023 under unclear circumstances.

7 January 2025: Lim Kim Ya, former Cambodian opposition MP, shot dead in Bangkok. A former Cambodian opposition parliamentarian, Lim Kim Ya was shot dead in Bangkok shortly after arriving from Cambodia. Investigations suggest cross-border coordination, with suspects linked to actors associated with the Cambodian ruling party. The Thai national murderer was extradited from Cambodia back to Thailand for trial, but Thai authorities are still seeking two Cambodian suspects, one of whom has ties to former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen.

REALITIES ON THE GROUND

Challenges	Case, Facts, and Comments

The Office of the Attorney General (OAG) must use its investigative powers in possible enforced disappearance cases, without requiring families to prove official involvement first.

Section 31 of the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2022) empowers public prosecutors and other competent authorities to investigate, provides for prosecutorial oversight, and establishes **"special case" treatment when a special case investigator undertakes the investigation**.

Where investigative responsibility is unclear, the Attorney General determines the responsible agency. These powers must enable prompt fact-finding, including into possible Thai or foreign official involvement, rather than leave families and civil society responsible for proving who committed the disappearance before an investigation begins. Sections 10 and 43 require continuing investigation to establish the disappeared person's fate and responsibility, including in earlier cases.



Khieo went missing a day before his first UNHCR interview, his testimony was left behind in his room. Prepared with support from Manushya, his handwritten statement documented the threats and digital transnational repression he faced and why he feared returning to Laos.

SOURCE: Manushya Foundation (2026 September)

15 September 2026: Khieo Lapchanh's disappearance exposes protection failures and barriers to justice. Khieo Lapchanh, a 26-year-old Lao political activist, has been missing since the early hours of 15 September 2026 in Samut Sakhon Province. Before his disappearance, he faced coordinated online harassment, doxxing, death threats, AI-generated content depicting violence against him, and an online bounty of USD 8,000 reportedly offered to have him killed. Lao Government officials visited his mother's home in Laos on 31 March and 17 April 2026. Fearing for his safety, Khieo stopped his online activism. He was last seen leaving work at approximately 2:00 a.m. on 15 September and did not return to his residence. His first UNHCR registration interview was scheduled for the following day, for which he had prepared testimony and evidence documenting the digital TNR he had endured.

Manushya Foundation filed a police report on 18 September and a complaint to the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand on 23 September 2026. When Manushya contacted the Office of the Attorney General (OAG), it initially declined to investigate under the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2022), insisting that Manushya first provide evidence of Thai authorities' involvement. This refusal persisted despite Manushya's explanation that the disappearance warranted investigation as a special case under Section 31 of the Act and that establishing whether State officials were involved was the authorities' investigative duty. This placed the burden of establishing official involvement on those seeking an investigation, creating a barrier to justice at a time when urgent action was needed to locate Khieo and preserve evidence.

On 5 October 2026, Manushya submitted an **Urgent Action request under Article 30 of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance**. Within three days, on 8 October, the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) registered Urgent Action No. 2394/2026, requesting immediate measures to locate Khieo, investigate his disappearance and preserve critical evidence, with a response from Thailand by 22 October 2026.

Only following this intervention did the OAG acknowledge its competence to investigate under Section 31 of the Act. The OAG explained that it regarded the alleged offence as a crime against the Thai State and would treat it as a special case, enabling an investigation to proceed without a formal complaint from Khieo's relatives. **This could mark an important precedent for investigating the suspected transnational repression of a foreign national under the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2022).** Yet the initial rejection and need for UN intervention expose persistent barriers to timely access to justice. Recognition of investigative competence must now translate into an effective search, an independent investigation and accountability. Responsibility for Khieo's disappearance, including any foreign-State involvement and links to the preceding digital threats, remains to be established.

REALITIES ON THE GROUND

Challenges | **Case, Facts, and Comments**

Challenge 5: Surveillance, harassment, arrests, detention, and criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to at-risk dissidents in Thailand



TNR in Thailand also manifests through systematic surveillance, intimidation and coercion by foreign authorities operating on Thai territory, often with the presence or acquiescence of Thai authorities. Arrest and detention are systematically used as tools of TNR, transforming immigration enforcement and legal frameworks into mechanisms of control over exiled activists and refugees, particularly when their legal status is undermined by actions from their countries of origin such as passport cancellation or politically motivated extradition requests.

The framing of dissidents and refugees as threats to 'national security' is systematically weaponised to justify prolonged administrative detention, refusal of the National Screening Mechanism, denial of bail and revocation of legal status. Administrative measures deliberately create legal precarity: authorities have revoked work permits and legal authorisation on national security grounds without adequate safeguards or due process, as observed in the cases of Phyo Paing and Naing Naing Soe, two Burmese migrant workers and activists whose work permits were revoked and who continue to be detained at Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre after being denied access to the National Screening Mechanism and having bail applications rejected on 'national security' grounds. This transforms administrative decisions into tools of TNR by stripping individuals of legal status and exposing them to immigration detention.

The framing of dissidents as 'terrorists' by their States of origin, combined with the abuse of Interpol Red Notices and bilateral extradition requests, is systematically weaponised to secure their arrest and prolonged pre-extradition detention on Thai soil. Human rights organisations have documented that Vietnamese authorities in particular have relied on in absentia convictions from "mobile court" mass trials, and on Interpol's Red Notice system, to pursue Montagnard, ethnic, religious and pro-democracy activists in exile. This transforms Thai immigration and criminal-procedure frameworks into instruments of transnational repression, as illustrated by the pre-extradition detention of Montagnard human rights defender Y Quynh Bdap between June 2024 and November 2025 (see Challenge 2 for his forced return on 28 November 2025).

Ongoing: cross-border operations by Vietnamese and Cambodian authorities. Vietnamese authorities have conducted direct operations on Thai territory, including visits to Montagnard refugee communities, where individuals were pressured to return to Viet Nam, threatened with arrest, and recorded on video, reportedly with the presence or acquiescence of Thai authorities. Cambodian authorities have actively pursued opposition figures in Thailand, including Chhin Chou, who fled after threats, surveillance and accusations of treason. Cambodian-Thai cooperation to locate and potentially extradite her raises serious concerns.

December 2023 and February 2024: refugee arrests timed to Cambodian PM visits. In December 2023, ten Cambodian refugees were detained while attending a workshop in Bangkok. In February 2024, three Cambodian activists (Kung Raiya, Phorn Phana and Lem Sokha), all UNHCR-registered refugees, were arrested alongside their family members ahead of an official visit by Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet.

April 2025 to present: Phyo Paing and Naing Naing Soe detained under 'national security' framing. Burmese migrant workers and activists Phyo Paing and Naing Naing Soe were arrested by Thai authorities in April 2025 and remain detained at Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre. They have been denied access to the National Screening Mechanism and their bail applications have been rejected on 'national security' grounds, illustrating how national-security framings are used to prolong administrative detention of migrant activists and block access to protection procedures.



Montagnard human rights activist Y Quỳnh Bdap is a recognised UN refugee since 2018.
Thai authorities extradited him to Vietnam on 28 November 2025, and his whereabouts remain unknown.

SOURCE: Radio Free Asia (RFA) (8 July 2024)

11 June 2024 to 28 November 2025: Y Quynh Bdap detained in Bangkok on the basis of Vietnam's 'terrorism' conviction and extradition request. Montagnard human rights defender and UNHCR-recognised refugee Y Quynh Bdap, co-founder of Montagnards Stand for Justice, was arrested by Thai Immigration Police in Bangkok on 11 June 2024 following an extradition request from Viet Nam. Vietnamese authorities had convicted him in absentia in January 2024 during a compressed five-day "mobile court" mass trial of nearly 100 defendants in connection with the June 2023 Dak Lak police station attacks, sentencing him to 10 years' imprisonment on terrorism charges that human rights organisations have documented as trumped-up. He was held at Bangkok Remand Prison for over 17 months while extradition proceedings ran. On 30 September 2024, the Bangkok Criminal Court authorised his extradition; on 26 November 2025, the Court of Appeals upheld that ruling, dismissing extensive documentation of the risk of torture and enforced disappearance and relying instead on diplomatic assurances from Vietnam's Ministry of Public Security. He was extradited on 28 November 2025 with only 24 hours' notice to his defence team. His case illustrates how 'terrorism' designations by States of origin, combined with bilateral extradition requests and, more broadly, the abuse of Interpol Red Notices against exiled dissidents, are used to convert Thai criminal-procedure and immigration mechanisms into tools of TNR.

REALITIES ON THE GROUND

Challenges	Case, Facts, and Comments

Section 64 of the Immigration Act criminalises assistance to individuals without legal status, with no humanitarian exemption.

In practice, it is used to intimidate lawyers, women HRDs, and civil society actors supporting refugees and at-risk activists. The CEDAW Committee (2025) explicitly called on Thailand to amend Section 64 to ensure that women HRDs are not penalised for supporting undocumented migrants.



"Don't deport Zhou Junyi."
Protesters outside the Royal Thai Consulate General in Los Angeles call on Thailand to protect Chinese dissident Zhou Junyi, who was arrested in Bangkok in June 2025 and faces risk if returned to China.

SOURCE: Larchmont Chronicle (17 June 2025)

June 2025 to August 2026: Chinese dissidents detained at Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre.

Between June 2025 and August 2026, at least four Chinese dissidents were detained at Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre: Zhou Junyi, 54, a member of the banned China Democracy Party arrested by Bangkok police in June 2025 after organising a memorial event for the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre; Bai Zhaodong, a 56-year-old former Caijing investigative journalist held since 21 January 2026 despite completing a two-month sentence for immigration-related offences issued in March 2026, and whose resettlement to a safe third country has been blocked twice by Thai authorities; Zhang Xinyan, 56, a Falun Gong practitioner arrested in May 2026, blocked from flying to Canada for resettlement on 8 July 2026 and eventually allowed to reach Canada on 5 August 2026 after sustained international pressure; and Tan Yixiang, 49, detained since February 2024 and quietly deported to China on 17 July 2026 with no notice to UNHCR, his lawyer or Canadian authorities involved in his resettlement (see Challenge 2). On 5 August 2026, UN experts issued a public call urging Thailand not to return Bai Zhaodong to China. Pressure intensified ahead of PM Anutin's 16-20 July 2026 visit to China. Chinese embassy officials repeatedly visited Zhou Junyi at Suan Phlu and pressured him to sign a 'voluntary return' form.

January 2026: Pen Mom, Cambodian woman HRD and UNHCR-recognised refugee, arrested.

Cambodian woman human rights defender Pen Mom, a UNHCR-recognised refugee, was arrested and detained, placing her at immediate risk of deportation and renewed persecution.

March 2026: Le Chi Thanh, Vietnamese anti-corruption activist, arrested and detained at Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre.

Le Chi Thanh was arrested by Thai immigration authorities after his passport was cancelled by Vietnamese authorities, rendering him undocumented and exposing him to deportation. He has been detained since March 2026 at Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre. HRW issued a joint statement on 1 July 2026 on Viet Nam's transnational repression in Thailand.

7 August 2026: Min Aung Hlaing's official visit to Thailand.

The official visit of Myanmar's junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing to Thailand on 7 August 2026 raised serious concerns regarding Thailand's posture as a regional TNR hub and its willingness to legitimise authoritarian consolidation in the region, with direct implications for the safety of over four million Myanmar nationals in Thailand and Burmese activists and refugees who fled the 2021 coup.

September 2026: extradition proceedings against Bai Zhaodong escalate despite an approved third-country resettlement pathway.

On 16 September 2026, the Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against Bai Zhaodong on an extortion charge, triggering the extradition process. At a hearing on 18 September, his lawyers separately challenged the legality of his continued immigration detention, arguing that detention pending departure was no longer justified because a third country had already approved his resettlement. The South Bangkok Criminal Court is scheduled to rule on the detention challenge on 9 October 2026. Bai's lawyer also reported that Chinese officials had recently visited his family and asked his child to persuade him to return to China voluntarily.

June 2024: Manushya Foundation and Emilie Palamy Pradichit threatened with legal action.

Thai immigration authorities threatened legal action against Manushya Foundation and its Founder and Executive Director Emilie Palamy Pradichit under Section 64 of the Immigration Act, following the provision of protection services to a Vietnamese activist refugee. This illustrates how Section 64 is deployed against lawyers and defenders providing legal and humanitarian assistance.

REALITIES ON THE GROUND

Challenges | **Case, Facts, and Comments**

Challenge 6: Cross-border pursuit of Thai activists in exile, and gendered dimensions of transnational repression

Thailand is not only a territorial hub where foreign dissidents are targeted, but also a State of origin whose nationals are pursued abroad. Thailand's expression-related laws, particularly Section 112 (lèse-majesté), Section 116 (sedition) and the Computer Crimes Act, contain vaguely defined provisions used as a dragnet to criminalise HRDs and force them to flee, while they remain vulnerable to further targeting in the form of TNR. (For the domestic weaponisation of these laws against online expression, see companion factsheet on Digital Rights in Thailand.)

Repression against Thai activists abroad is reinforced by a lack of accountability: Thai authorities have consistently failed to conduct credible investigations into cross-border abductions and enforced disappearances, while judicial oversight remains weak or ineffective. HRW World Report 2026 records that none of the outstanding enforced disappearance cases involving nine exiled Thai dissidents abducted in neighbouring countries have been resolved.

TNR carries specific gendered and intersectional impacts. Online targeting and sexual violence function as gendered tools of TNR, disproportionately affecting women HRDs through harassment, threats, digital smear campaigns, surveillance, sexual intimidation and assault. These tactics aim not only to punish individual women but to damage their credibility, isolate them from support networks, deter their public participation, and create a climate of fear that shrinks civic space across borders.

CEDAW (2025) and CAT (2024) on protection of WHRDs.
The CEDAW Committee (2025) called for a safe and enabling environment for women HRDs, protection from digital and physical attacks, and gender-responsive investigation and remedies. The Committee against Torture (2024) highlighted patterns of harassment, surveillance, and killings of HRDs, alongside the lack of effective remedies for victims, and called for prompt, effective and impartial investigation by an independent mechanism.

Wanchalearm Satsaksit: abducted in Phnom Penh, June 2020, remains disappeared.
Thai pro-democracy activist Wanchalearm Satsaksit, living in exile in Cambodia after facing Section 112 and CCA charges linked to his online expression, was abducted in Phnom Penh in June 2020. His enforced disappearance remains unresolved and has had a profound chilling effect on Thai activists abroad.

Pavin Chachavalpongpun: chemical attack in Kyoto, 2019.
Academic in exile in Japan, Pavin Chachavalpongpun reported being targeted in 2019 by a chemical attack at his residence in Kyoto, in the context of sustained harassment linked to his criticism of the Thai monarchy. Japanese authorities subsequently prosecuted the attacker, who was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.

Nine exiled Thai dissidents were abducted in neighbouring countries.
These include Surachai Danwattananusorn (disappeared in Laos after years of criticism of the monarchy); Ittipon Sukpaen and Wuthipong Kachathamakul (vanished in exile); Chucheep Chiwasut, Siam Theerawut and Kritsana Thapthai (reportedly rendered back to Thailand and not seen since); and Chatchan Buppawan and Kraidej Leulert (Thai activists who fled to neighbouring countries and disappeared).

Attacks against Lao dissidents in Thailand and abroad, including after resettlement.

Anousa "Jack" Luangsuphom, who was in hiding in Thailand following an attempted assassination in Laos in April 2023, faced ongoing threats prior to his resettlement in 2025.

Joseph Akaravong, who fled to Thailand after exposing corruption, continued to face transnational threats even after his resettlement to France, including an attempted murder in June 2025.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. On Challenge 1: Legal recognition of TNR, suspension of the fast-track deportation regulation, immigration reform, and asylum framework

1.1 Immediately suspend implementation of the Prime Minister's Office Regulation on Deportation B.E. 2569 (signed 26 August 2026, entered into force 28 August 2026), establish a mandatory individualised protection-risk assessment before any deportation, guarantee access to legal counsel and UNHCR, provide an effective appeal with automatic suspensive effect, expressly exempt political refugees, asylum seekers and others requiring international protection from fast-track removal, ensure independent oversight and full transparency over every deportation decision, and bring all safeguards into line with Thailand's obligations under Section 13 of the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2023), ICCPR Articles 2(3), 6, 7 and 13, CAT Article 3, and ICPPED Article 16, as urged by UN experts on 5 August 2026.

This UPR Factsheet was prepared by **Manushya Foundation, Power by the Keyboard, Mother Nature Cambodia, Khmer Democratic Rescue Foundation, Viet Tan, Khmer Democracy Organization, Asylum Access Thailand, and the Thai CSOs Coalition for the UPR and UN Mechanisms**

1.2	Adopt an explicit legal and policy framework recognising transnational repression as a distinct human rights violation, with a designated lead authority, coordinated early-warning and protection mechanisms, safeguards for prevention, independent investigation, prosecution of perpetrators and facilitators, and effective remedies for victims; revise foreign State immunity laws to enable individuals affected by transnational repression to seek legal remedies in national courts; ensure that administrative decisions, national-security grounds, 'terrorism' designations and INTERPOL Red Notice mechanisms are not instrumentalised as tools of transnational repression; and require an independent human rights review prior to any decision on an extradition request based on 'terrorism' or 'national security' charges from a State of origin, rejecting requests linked to documented patterns of persecution.
1.3	Amend the Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979), particularly Sections 36 and 54, to conform with international standards prohibiting criminal prosecution and indefinite detention for irregular entry, and to end the practice of treating HRDs, refugees and asylum seekers as irregular migrants. Ensure administrative detention is applied only as a last resort, when strictly necessary and proportionate, for the shortest period possible, with regular judicial review, in line with the 2024 CAT Concluding Observations.
1.4	Ratify the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and adopt a rights-based asylum system that guarantees protection from refoulement, arbitrary detention and cross-border persecution, including TNR, in line with 3rd UPR recommendations 52.14, 52.15 and 51.16.
1.5	Reform the National Screening Mechanism to explicitly recognise TNR as a risk factor, guarantee independence and transparency, ensure effective coordination with UNHCR, provide guarantees of confidentiality and protection from interference by foreign authorities, and end the parallel operation of immigration enforcement mechanisms that continue to criminalise those eligible for protection.
1.6	Ensure that extradition procedures and mutual legal assistance agreements, including the May 2025 Thailand-Viet Nam agreement and the 28 May 2026 joint political-activism suppression pledge between PM Anutin and Vietnamese President To Lam, are transparent, incorporate binding human rights and refugee law safeguards, and guarantee compliance with the prohibition of refoulement and respect for fair trial. End informal cross-border cooperation practices, including "swap mart" arrangements. End bilateral pledges to suppress political activism against foreign governments.
1.7	Establish a national asylum law and procedure that grants applicants lawful status while their claims are assessed, guarantees access to UNHCR and counsel, prohibits detention and removal before an effective decision, and provides independent appeal with suspensive effect.
1.8	Establish a national TNR early-warning and prevention system that treats digital surveillance, doxxing, threats to family members, passport cancellation, politically motivated INTERPOL notices, extradition requests and unusual immigration action as potential indicators of escalating cross-border risk; require rapid individualised risk assessment and protective action before detention, deportation, extradition or disclosure of personal data to a foreign State.

2. On Challenge 2: Enforce non-refoulement and end forced deportations

2.1	Ensure in law and in practice, in line with the 2024 CAT Concluding Observations, that no one may be expelled, returned or extradited to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture, including by prohibiting mass expulsions such as the June 2024 mass expulsion of Myanmar asylum seekers and the 27 February 2025 deportation of 40 Uyghurs to China.
2.2	Ensure the right to an individualised determination of the risk of torture or ill-treatment that expulsion, return or extradition may present, by a judicial authority endowed with sufficient competence to take into account all necessary facts and circumstances, and guarantee effective access to procedural safeguards, including the right to appeal adverse decisions, with automatic suspensive effect.
2.3	Publicly account for and remediate the November 2024 forced return of six Cambodian opposition activists (Pen Chan Sangkream, Hong An, Mean Chanthon, Yin Chanthou, Soeung Khunthea and Vorn Chanratchana) and their family members; the 27 February 2025 deportation of 40 Uyghurs to China; the 28 November 2025 forced return of Y Quynh Bdap to Viet Nam under a 'terrorism' conviction obtained in absentia; and the 17 July 2026 quiet deportation of Tan Yixiang to China with no notice to UNHCR, his lawyer or the Canadian authorities involved in his resettlement; take diplomatic steps to secure their safety, whereabouts and access to fair proceedings; and end the practice of using 'terrorism' designations by States of origin as a basis for extradition and forced return.
2.4	Halt any pending or planned deportations of UNHCR-recognised refugees and asylum seekers to countries where they face substantial risk of persecution, torture, arbitrary detention or enforced disappearance, and ensure independent judicial review of all removal decisions with automatic suspensive effect.

2.5	Adopt gender-sensitive protection frameworks for women asylum seekers and refugees, in line with the 2025 CEDAW Concluding Observations, including individualised risk assessments accounting for gender-based persecution, protection from gender-based violence in immigration detention, and safeguards to prevent mothers and children from being held in immigration detention centres.

3. On Challenge 3: Digital TNR as a pathway to physical TNR

3.1	Establish an effective protection and rapid-response mechanism for persons targeted by digital TNR, including confidential reporting, urgent risk assessment, and appropriate protective measures where digital surveillance, doxxing, exposure of location information, death threats, or coordinated cross-border harassment indicate a risk of physical TNR.
3.2	In line with the CAT Concluding Observations (2024), promptly, thoroughly, and impartially investigate allegations of digital surveillance, online harassment, threats, and other forms of digital targeting against human rights defenders, ensure accountability for perpetrators, and provide effective protection and remedies.
3.3	Ensure that Thai authorities do not collect, use, disclose, or share personal, communications, location, or surveillance data in a manner that enables foreign governments or their proxies to identify, locate, monitor, or target dissidents, and subject cross-border information-sharing and surveillance practices to clear legal safeguards, independent oversight, and effective remedies.

4. On Challenge 4: Investigate and prosecute enforced disappearances and killings on Thai territory

4.1	Ensure that all complaints of enforced disappearance, killing and violent attack against foreign dissidents on Thai territory are investigated in a prompt, effective and impartial manner by an independent mechanism, in line with the 2024 CAT Concluding Observations. There should be no institutional or hierarchical relationship between the investigators and suspected perpetrators.
4.2	Ensure that the crimes of torture and enforced disappearance are not subject to any statute of limitations, in order to preclude the risk of impunity for the perpetrators of such crimes.
4.3	Provide public updates on outstanding investigations, including the January 2025 killing of Lim Kim Ya in Bangkok (including the two Cambodian suspects still being sought), the May 2023 death of Bounsuan Kitiyano in Ubon Ratchathani, the April 2023 abduction of Duong Van Thai near Bangkok, the 2019 abduction of Truong Duy Nhat in Bangkok, and the August 2019 disappearance of Od Sayavong.
4.4	Enhance transparency regarding the work of the National Committee on the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance, including by regularly keeping victims and the public abreast of efforts and developments relevant to cases, intensifying effective collaboration with civil society, and consider amending the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act to include victims of enforced disappearance in the membership of the National Committee.
4.5	Compile and make available disaggregated data on the number of complaints of TNR-related torture, ill-treatment and enforced disappearance received by all bodies mandated with their investigation, along with data on all investigations, disciplinary measures, prosecutions and convictions, including information on punishments and whether victims received redress.
4.6	Fully implement the Committee on Enforced Disappearances' Urgent Action No. 2394/2026 concerning Khieo Lapchanh: urgently establish his fate and whereabouts, preserve critical evidence, and conduct a prompt, independent and effective investigation under the Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance Act B.E. 2565 (2022), including possible foreign-State involvement and links to documented digital threats; proceed without requiring a formal complaint from relatives or prior proof of Thai officials' involvement, ensure accountability for perpetrators and facilitators, and provide regular progress updates to his legal representatives and relatives.

5. On Challenge 5: End surveillance, arbitrary arrest and detention, and decriminalise humanitarian assistance

5.1	End practices that facilitate cross-border operations by foreign authorities on Thai territory, including presence or acquiescence at coercive visits to Montagnard and Hmong refugee communities, cooperation in the pursuit of Cambodian opposition figures such as Chhin Chou, and arbitrary detention of dissidents timed to coincide with visits by foreign heads of State (as in February 2024 with Kung Raiya, Phorn Phana and Lem Sokha, and December 2023 with 10 Cambodian refugees).

For more information, evidence and data, please contact
Emilie Palamy Pradichit, Manushya Foundation. Email: emilie@manushyafoundation.org

5.2	Release Le Chi Thanh, detained at Bangkok's Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre since March 2026 following the cancellation of his passport by Vietnamese authorities, and Pen Mom, arrested in January 2026, and ensure protection from refoulement and access to durable solutions.
5.3	Immediately release Bai Zhaodong (held at Suan Phlu since 21 January 2026 despite completing his immigration sentence in March 2026), Zhou Junyi (arrested June 2025 after a Tiananmen memorial event), and any other Chinese dissidents in detention. Halt any deportation, extradition or forced return to China. Allow them to resettle safely in third countries without further delay or obstruction. Disclose the whereabouts, condition and legal basis of Tan Yixiang's 17 July 2026 deportation to China, and demand guarantees for his safety and freedom, in line with the 5 August 2026 call by UN experts.
5.4	End the practice of revoking work permits and legal authorisation of migrant activists on national security grounds without adequate safeguards or due process, as observed in the cases of Phyo Paing and Naing Naing Soe, who remain detained at Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre after being denied access to the National Screening Mechanism and having bail applications rejected on 'national security' grounds since April 2025; and ensure that administrative decisions, national-security framings, 'terrorism' designations and Interpol Red Notice mechanisms are not instrumentalised as tools of TNR; require an independent, prior human rights review of every extradition request based on 'terrorism' or 'national security' charges from a State of origin, and reject such requests where in absentia convictions, mass trials or documented persecution patterns are involved, as in the Y Quynh Bdap case.
5.5	Amend Section 64 of the Immigration Act B.E. 2522 (1979), in line with the 2025 CEDAW concluding observations, to expressly exclude from its criminal scope legal, humanitarian and protection assistance provided to refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in an irregular situation, including human rights defenders in exile, and ensure that lawyers, human rights defenders and organisations providing such assistance face no prosecution or reprisals for these activities.
5.6	Establish a permanent, rights-based TNR coordination and rapid-response mechanism with designated focal points across relevant Thai authorities, the NHRCT and protection partners; confidential referral protocols; 24/7 emergency escalation pathways; cross-border risk monitoring; and clear procedures for safe housing, legal assistance, alternatives to detention, UNHCR access and diplomatic protection. Ensure survivor-centred, gender-sensitive and intersectional participation in its design and operation.
5.7	Ensure that political activists held on immigration or national-security grounds can seek effective judicial review and release; review repeated bail refusals and work-permit cancellations in the cases of Phyo Paing and Naing Naing Soe, and prevent untested security allegations from blocking the NSM.

6. On Challenge 6: Protect Thai activists abroad and address gendered dimensions of TNR

6.1	Cease all acts of transnational repression against Thai dissidents and activists living abroad, including surveillance and coordination with foreign governments for the purposes of targeting individuals for their expression, in line with the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders' 2022 report on transnational repression.
6.2	Provide public updates on the investigation of the enforced disappearance of Wanchalearm Satsaksit in Phnom Penh in June 2020 and the outstanding cases of at least nine exiled Thai dissidents abducted in neighbouring countries, including Surachai Danwattananusorn, Ittipon Sukpaen, Wuthipong Kachathamakul, Chucheep Chiwasut, Siam Theerawut, Kritsana Thapthai, Chatchan Buppawan and Kraidej Leulert, and ensure meaningful engagement with families of the disappeared.
6.3	Undertake due diligence to identify risks of digital transnational threats against exiled Thai media and journalists, with input from exiled media, and enhance safety tools and other measures to mitigate them, in line with recommendations set out in the companion factsheet on Digital Rights in Thailand.
6.4	Review protection policies and programmes so that HRDs and others who seek refuge or are in exile benefit from support and holistic protection, including through documentation and legal assistance, humanitarian visas, effective resettlement programmes, psychosocial and livelihood support, counselling, and peer support. Tailor measures to different needs, including those of women HRDs and different communities affected by intersectional risks.
6.5	Ensure that TNR protection policies and programmes are victim-centred, gender-sensitive, intersectional, inclusive and non-discriminatory. Recognise the gendered and intersectional impacts of TNR, including sexual violence, digital smear campaigns, and coordinated online harassment targeting women HRDs, and provide gender-responsive investigation, protection and remedies, in line with CEDAW General Recommendation 35.

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